





Employment protection (EP) is one of the institu-
tions that is of decisive importance in determining
how labour markets function.It places constraints on
the individual behaviour of market participants. It
takes the form of laws, ordinances and legal prece-
dents together with norms and customs.The scientif-
ic analysis of EP is concerned firstly with its origin
and evolution and secondly with its effects.
Whilst these two areas of analysis have received a
great deal of attention, EP itself has been mostly ne-
glected. It must, however, be investigated in depth if
one is to find an explanation for its origins and if its
effects. Assessing EP requires that it be clearly de-
fined and delimited.What is more, it is necessary to
formulate a theoretical concept that can serve as a ba-
sis for understanding it. Furthermore, it must be in-
vestigated empirically. Qualitative information must
be transformed into quantitative information.And fi-
nally, it may prove to be necessary to aggregate indi-
vidual indicators to a composite indicator.
Definitions 
The term EP refers both to regulations concerning
hiring as well as firing. In the first instance, the rele-
vant regulations concern the conditions under which
temporary contracts (fixed-term contracts and tem-
porary agency work) may be concluded, which offer
the possibility of circumventing the provisions of pro-
tection against dismissal within a regular employment
relationship. Regulations with respect to dismissal
concern both the individual termination of a regular
employment relationship and collective dismissals.
The protection of regularly employed workers
against dismissal represents a restriction on employ-
ers,who are no longer free to give notice to their em-
ployees without justification.This restriction has been
attained through two types of sanctions: the obliga-
tion to continue the employment relationship despite
notice having been given or severance pay.The prior
condition for the general protection against wrongful
dismissal to be effective is that an employment rela-
tionship should in fact exist, i.e. that someone is in a
position of dependent gainful employment. And fi-
nally, there are certain conditions that must be ful-
filled if collective dismissal is to be legally justified.
The character of EP is affected by the nature of the
legal system.This influence is quite distinct, depend-
ing on whether the legal system is based on English
common law or whether it is based on civil (or statu-
tory) law. Common law is characterised by the im-
portance of decisions made by juries,by independent
judges and the emphasis on judicial discretion as op-
posed to the dominance of codified law. The system
of common law evolved originally in England and
was adapted by other English speaking countries.
Civil law is characterised by a less independent judi-
ciary and gives a greater role to codified substantive
and procedural rules. It evolved out of Roman law
and has been incorporated into the civil codes of
France and Germany and adopted by many countries
on the European continent and by Japan (Botero et
al. 2003, 7–9; Deakin et al. 2007).
Measurement
Assessing EP in depth is difficult.The arrangements
that exist as a result of constitutional provisions,legal
measures or collective agreements are complex and
the documentation of their implementation is in-
complete. The complexity becomes apparent when
for example the OECD (2004) employs not less than
eight indicators of protection against dismissal of em-
ployees with regular employment contracts:notifica-
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tion procedure; delay involved before notice can be
given; length of notice period; severance pay; defini-
tion of unfair dismissal; length of trial period; com-
pensation following unfair dismissal;and possibilities
of obtaining reinstatement after unfair dismissal. In
order to identify the provisions applicable in this area
it is necessary to analyse very carefully the laws,ordi-
nances and wage agreements.But this is only the first
step; one must also take into the account how these
provisions are implemented and enforced.And this is
up to courts, arbitration boards and the public ad-
ministration in general.Courts of law,for example,in-
terpret how the law is to be applied,decide on the re-
instatement of employees in the event of wrongful dis-
missal, and determine the amount of severance pay,
etc. Furthermore, it is of interest to know what pro-
portion of employees take legal action in a court of
law to make good their right to seek protection
against wrongful dismissal; it is equally interesting to
know how often such legal action is successful.There
is a similar need for information about the decisions
of arbitration boards and the public administration.
Administrative records represent an important source
of information with respect to the implementation
and enforcement of EP (Bertola et al.1999 and 2000).
The assessment of EP in all its complexity involves
the summing-up and interpretation of laws, ordi-
nances and court decisions by experts.An example of
what is meant by summing-up and interpretation is
provided by the OECD’s description of EP regula-
tions (OECD 2004, background material for chapter
2). As a rule, assessments are made by assigning
scores.Scores may be assigned along a metric scale or
may be based on rank. Since EP is typically multidi-
mensional, the task of reducing it to quantitative in-
dices is not simple. And if the indicators are aggre-
gated to a composite indicator the problem of weight-
ing arises (Freudenberg 2003).
If assessing EP in one country is a problem,then ob-
taining data for international comparisons is all the
more difficult. The assessment of EP in different
countries can be carried out centrally,e.g.by a supra-
national organisation, or decentrally by experts in
each country.In both cases assessment problems arise
(Ochel 2005).
The information used for international comparisons
should be comparable.Problems of validity may arise,
when EP has evolved in different contexts:for exam-
ple in a society with a common law tradition as op-
posed to the civil law tradition of continental
European countries. In this case a uniform concept
and similar indicators do not adequately reflect EP.
The strictness of EP in the Anglo-American countries
cannot be registered with the use of indicators that
are primarily geared to codified laws.And vice versa,
it would not be suitable to examine the dismissal pro-
tection regulations of continental European countries
using indicators that are primarily based on legal
precedents (court decisions). One approach to over-
coming this problem is to replace the identity of con-
cepts and indicators by the functional equivalence of
concepts and indicators (Kenworthy and Kittel 2003,
22).Measurement concepts are equivalent to the de-
gree to which “[the] results provided by [them,W.O.]
reliably describe with (nearly) the same validity par-
ticular phenomena in different social systems”
(Przeworski and Teune 1970, 108).
If one goes beyond cross-section comparisons and at-
tempts a panel analysis, then the concept employed
in analysing EP must be adjusted to take into account
its evolution in the course of time. Basic changes in
the regulatory framework must be considered as well
as the emergence of new forms of employment rela-
tionships such as fixed-term contracts or temporary
agency work.
Data sets
One approach to quantifying the strictness of EP in
inter-country comparisons is to use surveys.Such sur-
veys were carried out for the first time in 1985. The
International Association of Employers commis-
sioned surveys in 14 countries designed to assess the
severity of rules restraining the termination of em-
ployment contracts. In the same year, the Com-
mission of the European Union conducted a survey
of entrepreneurs in 9 EU countries.In this survey the
respondents were asked to assess the employment ef-
fect of shorter periods of notice of dismissal, of sim-
pler legal procedures, and of a reduction in redun-
dancy payments (Emerson [1988]) reviews the results
of these surveys). Bertola (1990) based his rankings
of ten industrial countries on the information ob-
tained from these surveys. At the present time, or-
ganisations such as Watson Wyatt Data Services and
the World Economic Forum carry out surveys.
Whilst the surveys mentioned above request infor-
mation about the general assessment of the strictness
of EP, others based their assessment on indicators
(Table 1). Lazear (1990) considered only two obsta-cles to firing workers:weeks of notice and severance
pay. Grubb and Wells (1993) and the OECD Job
Study (1994) considered eight indicators referring to
obstacles to dismissal of employees with regular
contracts (indicators one to eight in Table 2). They
also consider the possibilities of circumventing gen-
eral EP by means of fixed-term contracts and tem-
porary work agency employment.Regulatory efforts
in these two areas are represented by a further six
indicators (indicators nine to fourteen in Table 2).In
the OECD’s Employment Outlook 1999 and 2004
these studies have been broadened by the inclusion
of indicators bearing on collective dismissal (indica-
tors fifteen to eighteen in Table 2).The descriptions
of these 18 indicators are based on a variety of na-
tional sources as well as multi-country surveys by
Watson Wyatt Data Services,Incomes Data Services
and the European Commission. OECD govern-
ments provided additional information based on a
request for information from the OECD Secretariat
(OECD 1999, 90).
In order to obtain a time series for the period 1960 to
1996, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) collated the
OECD data for the late 1980s and 1990s with data
from Lazear (1990).They combined data of a very dif-
ferent quality.Whereas the OECD indicator is based
on many EP dimensions Lazear used just two indica-
tors as a proxy for EP.Nickell et al.(2005) later on in-
terpolated the Blanchard and Wolfers series (with da-
ta for every five years) in order to obtain annual da-
ta, and William Nickell updated them in 2006.
Another major source for EP data are the Doing
Business Reports of the International Finance
Corporation of the World Bank Group. It has been
publishing its Employing Workers Indicator since
2004.The theoretical framework and methodology is
based on Botero et al. (2004).
The datasets presented up to now are generated by
cross-sectional approaches. They refer to some data
points and afterwards have been interpolated in or-
der to produce time series. Recently attempts have
been made to generate “true” time series with annu-
al data by analyzing reforms of EP. Brandt et al.
(2005) reassessed the recommendations of the
OECD Jobs Strategy and provides a detailed de-
scription of EP reforms over the 1994-2004 period.
Allard (2005) reviews changes of EP documented by
ILO’s International Encyclopedia for Labor Law and
Industrial Relations.Based on the OECD methodol-
ogy she offers country scores for 1950-2003 at the ag-
gregate level. Amable et al. (2007) use the Social
Reforms Database of the Fondazione Rodolfo
Debenetti and run regressions with the help of these
data to predict the evolution of the strictness of EP
between 1980 and 2004. The Centre of Business
Research (CBR) in Cambridge measures legal
change over time (influenced by either common law
or civil law regulatory styles) and constructs a longi-
tudinal labour regulation index (Deakin et al. 2007).
The OECD measure of employment protection
EP is assessed by the OECD Employment Outlook
1999 and 2004 for the late 1980s, the late 1990s and
2003. By means of 18 single indicators, EP of regular
workers against individual dismissal, the specific re-
quirements for collective dismissals and the regula-
tion of temporary forms of employment are sum-
marised.
In order to allow for meaningful comparisons,a four-
step procedure has been developed for constructing
cardinal summary indicators of strictness of EP.The
18 indicators are initially expressed in units of time
(e.g. months of notice), as a cardinal number (e.g.
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Table 1 
Sources of data on employment protection for
international comparisons
Lazear (1990)
Grubb and Wells (1993)
OECD Job Study (1994)
OECD, Employment Outlook (1999 and 2004)
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)
Nickell et al. (2005)
William Nickell, LSE database
Botero et al. (2004)
World Bank, Doing Business
Brandt et al. (2005)
Allard (2005)
Amable et al. (2007)
CBR, Cambridge (Deakin et al. 2007)
Comparable information on EP is also supplied by the
reports anddatabases of the Frazer Institute, the He-
ritage Foundation, the International Institute for Ma-
nagement Development, Lausanne, Watson Wyatt
Data Services and the World Economic Forum. 
Individual researchers have made important contribu-
tions on the concept and measurement of EP. See the
references in OECD (2004), ch. 2 and 3.
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maximum number of successive fixed-term contracts
allowed), or as a score on an ordinal scale (0 to 2, 3,
4 or simply yes/no).These first-level measures are ac-
counted for in comparable units and then converted
into cardinal scores ranging from 0 to 6.This scoring
algorithm is somewhat arbitrary (OECD 1999,Table
2.B.1 and OECD 2004,Table 2.A.1.1).The three re-
maining steps consist in forming successive weighted
averages,thus constructing three sets of summary in-
dicators that correspond to successively more aggre-
gated measures of strictness of EP (OECD 1999,
Annex 2 B; OECD 2004,Annex
2.A.1 and Table 2).
The OECD summary indicators
of the strictness of EP rank the
United States,Canada,the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Ireland and New
Zealand as the OECD member
countries providing in 2003 the
least EP. The results of the
OECD survey indicate that the
strictest protection against dis-
missal is to be found in three
southern European countries:
Greece, Spain and Portugal and
in the threshold countries Mexi-
co and Turkey (Table 3).
The indicator of the strictness of EP developed by the
OECD is in all likelihood one of the best indicators
that is available at the moment for the purpose of mak-
ing international comparisons in this area. Important
areas of regulation are taken into account.The choice
of 18 indicators goes far to take adequately into ac-
count the complexity of the problem.Nevertheless,the
OECD’s approach does have some weaknesses:
– The OECD focuses on laws and ordinances bear-
ing on protection against wrongful dismissal, but
Table 2 
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Table 3 







United States 0.7 Czech Republic 1.9 Norway 2.6
Canada 1.1 Korea 2.0 Sweden 2.6
United Kingdom 1.1 Slovak Republic 2.0 France 2.9
Ireland 1.3 Finland 2.1 Greece 2.9
New Zealand 1.3 Poland 2.1 Spain 3.1
Austria 1.5 Austria 2.2 Mexico 3.2
Switzerland 1.6 Netherlands 2.3 Portugal 3.5
Hungary 1.7 Italy 2.4 Turkey 3.5
Denmark 1.8 Belgium 2.5
Japan 1.8 Germany 2.5
a) Summary indicator for regular and temporary employment and collective 
dismissals. –
b) Higher scores represent stricter regulation.
Source: OECD (2004, 117).devotes little attention to other areas such as the
system of social security which also may provide
protection against loss of employment. One such
mechanism is the system of experience rating in
the United States where an employer’s social se-
curity contribution depends in part on the firm’s
lay-off activity.Then too,the interaction of the pro-
tection against dismissal with other labour market
institutions must be taken into account if the ac-
tual level of protection is to be determined. As
Belot and van Ours (2000) have shown, such in-
teractions may reinforce or undermine the level of
protection.
– The OECD’s measure of EP is mainly based on
legislative provisions.Protection against dismissal,
that is, a part of wage agreements or of individual
employment contracts (e.g. provisions for sever-
ance pay) is neglected.
– Differences in the form of legal rules are not cod-
ified.The extent to which they are formally bind-
ing or capable of modification by the parties (“de-
fault rules”) is not recorded.
– Similarly, the question to what extent the EP leg-
islation is actually enforced receives too little at-
tention. Up till now there has not been an ade-
quate response to Bertola et al.’s (1999) plea for
the enforcement of EP to be taken into account.
The implementation of regulatory measures that
are based on legal dispositions is primarily in the
hands of labour tribunals. They interpret the law
and hand down decisions on the cases brought be-
fore them. The stringency of the EP actually af-
forded to workers depends to a great extent on
these decisions. The importance of labour tri-
bunals, however, varies greatly from one country
to another.Sometimes disputes are resolved by ar-
bitration boards. It is difficult to collect systemat-
ic information on judicial and other resolution of
labour disputes (e.g.,on the number of cases in lit-
igation, how long they are pending and how they
are resolved), and work in this area has only just
begun.
– The OECD provides no information on the pro-
portion of employees that are covered by EP. It
thus does not take into account that legal provi-
sions, wage agreements, court decisions etc. exist
which preclude giving regular notice of dismissal
to certain clearly defined categories of employees
(e.g. older employees, or those who have worked
in the production unit for a certain period).On the
other hand, it does not take into account that the
application of EP may depend on the production
unit being larger than a minimum size and/or that
there may be provisions requiring a waiting peri-
od; persons economically active in a production
unit that have the formal legal status of self-em-
ployed (e.g., a sub-contractor) but are deemed to
be dependent employees or workers in the infor-
mal sector may not be covered by the EP provi-
sions either (Rebhahn 2003, 190–94).
– The OECD does not document the specific sour-
ces of its indicators and does not explain their cod-
ing.Furthermore,converting the first-level indica-
tors of EP legislation into cardinal scores and the
assignment of weights is somewhat arbitrary
(Addison and Teixeira 2001, 10–14). “The assign-
ment of scores and weights adds a subjective di-
mension to the EPL strictness scores that is addi-
tional to the judgements already embodied in
the…descriptive indicators” (OECD 1999, 117).
The extent to which the OECD has empirically
analysed the interrelationship among the first-lev-
el indicators is not clear.
– The OECD indicator for EP only covers the late
1980s, the late 1990s and 2003. In order to be able
to carry out panel analyses, it would be desirable
if the OECD provided longer and more complete
time series.These time series should,however,not
be generated by interpolation,but should be based
on an analysis of the pace and direction of EP re-
forms providing annual data for the strictness of
EP.
– Theoretical studies emphasise the analogy be-
tween EP regulation and a tax borne by the em-
ployer on employment adjustment. The cost im-
plications of the various regulatory provisions for
employees are not measured by the OECD.These
costs include severance payments, costs of litiga-
tion, and costs arising from legally proscribed pe-
riods of notice, social plans, and continued pay-
ment of remuneration for employees enjoying
protection. Furthermore, there are costs that are
borne by society in general such as unemployment
benefits (Jahn 2004, 11). Information on the costs
involved in hiring and firing for businesses are,
however, provided by other organisations such as
the World Bank Group (2008).
The employing workers indicators of Doing
Business
The assessment of the strictness of EP by the OECD
is mainly based on legislative provisions and neglects
the enforcement of the legislation.The World Bank’s
Doing Businesstries to include both components.The
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methodology for its employing workers indicators
was developed in Botero et al.(2004).They apply the
legal origin hypothesis to labour law.This hypothesis
claims that national regulatory styles are influenced
by the origins of legal systems, namely the English
common law or the civil law of continental Europe.
In order to document and analyse EP adequately in
countries with different legal origins, the assessment
has to include laws and public regulations, contracts
and juries’ decisions as well as their implementation.
This objective can be achieved if the assessment is
carried out by local experts who evaluate all compo-
nents of the strictness of EP in their country.
The data on employing workers in Doing Business is
based on surveys that are completed by local lawyers
and public officials. To ensure comparability across
countries the lawyers have to make the following as-
sumptions when answering the questions.The work-
er is a 42-year-old,non-executive,full-time male em-
ployee with 20 years of tenure.He earns a salary plus
benefits equal to the country’s average wage. He re-
sides in the largest business city and is not a member
of a labour union.The business he works for is a lim-
ited liability company, is domestically owned, oper-
ates in the manufacturing sector, has 201 employees,
is law-abiding,but does not grant workers more ben-
efits than mandated by law or collective bargaining
agreement.
The questionnaire refers to three institutional fields:
difficulty of hiring, rigidity of hours and difficulty of
firing and several components within each field.
Firing costs are also taken into account (Table 4).The
questionnaire does not include all of the topics pro-
posed by Botero et al. (2004).
The answers are most commonly recorded by binary
coding. For each of the fields the scores of the com-
ponents (0 or 1) are averaged and scaled to 100.Each
of the three subindices thus takes values between 0
and 100,with higher values indicating more rigid reg-
ulation. By averaging the three subindices, the index
of rigidity of employment is generated (World Bank
Group 2004).
Compared to the OECD indicators the Doing
Business indicators have the advantage of including
more countries and making use of local experts. On
the other hand they are confronted with as many
methodological objections as the OECD approach:
– One major limitation is the recourse to purely hy-
pothetical cases.The Employing Workers Index is
based on strong assumptions about the workers
and the enterprises in order to make internation-
al comparisons possible. The chosen cases are,
however, not at all representative for the labour
force and the size of firms of the different coun-
tries (Du Marais 2006). It would be useful if the
World Bank would provide more general infor-
mation (Davies and Kruse 2007).
– Another limitation relates to the enforcement pro-
cedures. From one country to the other there are
different degrees and ways of how national ad-
ministrations and labour courts determine the en-
Table 4 
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 Source: Doing Business; http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodologysurveys/employingworkers.aspxforcement of EP. It is doubtful whether enforce-
ment procedures have been adequately captured
(Berg and Cazes 2008, 366–67).
– Doing Business has created a unique information
gathering process based on a network of infor-
mants. It is however not clear how reliable the in-
formation is.The database is dependent on a small
number of informants in many countries.The an-
swers to the questionnaires are subjective. Un-
certainty about the regulatory environment is ne-
glected. It is doubtful whether national experts of
different countries employ the same standards in
assessing EP, etc. (IEG 2008, 52).
– In addition, methodological objections can be
raised against the coding method and the weight-
ing. Transforming qualitative and complex infor-
mation into quantitative variables by binary cod-
ing is critical (Berg and Cazes 2008, 370). Attri-
buting equal weight to the components and the
three subindices seems to be arbitrary.
The CBR labour regulation index
A major limitation of the OECD and the Doing
Business approaches is that they are cross-sectional.
They describe law in different countries as it stood
at a certain point in time.By interpolating the scores
of various data points time series can be generated.
But the pace and the direction of legal change is not
really captured by this approach. The Centre of
Business Research tries to overcome this shortcom-
ing by constructing a longitudinal labour regulation
index.This index is based on primary legal sources
and an evaluation of changes in labour law in the
course of time.The sources are fully set out (Deakin
et al. 2007).
The CBR index follows the same functional ap-
proach as Botero et al.(2004) which is to assume that
laws impose rules which limit the formal freedom of
employers and empower employees. It uses similar
categories of labour law as Botero et al. and Do-
ing Business: alternative employment contracts, the
regulation of working time and regulation of dis-
missal. These three categories consist of 24 indi-
vidual variables (Table 5; two further categories of
the index are excluded here: employee represen-
tation and industrial action).The CBR datasets cov-
er the development of labour law in France, Ger-
many, India, the UK and the US over the period
1970–2005.
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Table 5 
CBR labour regulation indices
Alternative employment contracts (0-1) Regulation of working time (0-1) Regulation of dismissal (0-1)
1 The law, as opposed to the con-
tracting parties, determines the
legal status of the worker
9 Annual leave entitlements 16 Legally mandatednotice 
period (all dismissals)
2 Part-time workers have the right to
equal treatment with full-time
workers
10 Public holiday entitlements 17 Legally mandated redun-
dancy compensation
3 The cost of dismissing part-time
workers is equal in proportionate
terms to the cost of dismissing full-
time workers
11 Overtime premia 18 Minimum qualifying period
of service for normal case of
unjust dismissal
4 Fixed-term contracts are allowed
only for work of limited duration
12 Weekend working 19 Law imposes procedural
constraints ondismissal
5 Fixed-term workers have the right
to equal treatment with permanent 
workers
13 Limits to overtime working 20 Law imposes substantive
constraints ondismissal
6 Maximum durationof fixed-term
contracts
14 Duration of the normal
working week
21 Reinstatement normal
remedy for unfair dismissal
7 Agency work is prohibited or
strictly controlled
15 Maximum daily working 
time
22 Notification of dismissal
8 Agency workers have the right to
equal treatment with permanent 
workers of the user firm
23 Redundancy selection
24 Priority in re-employment
 Source: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htmCESifo DICE Report 2/2009 37
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In spite of some similarities the CBR approach is dif-
ferent from the OECD and the Doing Business ap-
proaches.CBR does not try to estimate the impact of
labour law rules on a representative firm – as Doing
Business does – but wants to capture in general to
which extent regulations protect the interests of
workers as opposed to those of employers. In addi-
tion,CBR takes account not just of formal law but al-
so of self-regulatory mechanisms,including collective
agreements. It aims to reflect the systemic nature of
legal rules, that is to say, their structural relationship
to other rules in a given national context. Further-
more CBR attempts to capture to what extent rules
are mandatory and to what extent they can be modi-
fied (default rules). The CBR index avoids making
prior assumptions about the impacts of legal rules.It
seeks to be a pure measure of the content of the rule
(Deakin and Sarkar 2008, 22–27).
The CBR index is based on detailed country level da-
ta, covers a larger range of rules than other ap-
proaches by taking account of non-legal sources of
binding norms and default rules and utilizes a com-
plex coding process. Nevertheless it has some short-
comings. It neglects considering enforcement of EP
legislation and the judicial resolution of labour dis-
putes. It does not weight the variables. And it does
not provide information on the proportion of em-
ployees that are covered by EP.
Summary
Assessing EP is difficult. The arrangements that
exist as a result of laws, ordinances, self-regulato-
ry mechanisms and legal precedents are complex.
They are affected by the nature of the legal system.
The enforcement of EP legislation may be quite dif-
ferent.
Since the seminal study of Lazear in 1990 much
progress has been made in understanding and docu-
menting EP.The OECD indicator of the strictness of
EP,the Doing Business employing workers indicator
and the CBR labour regulation index are among the
best indicators that are available at the moment for
the purpose of making international comparisons.
They have different advantages. At the same time
they share some common shortcomings. None of
them captures in a functionally equivalent way the
different characteristics of EP in civil and common
law countries.All of them neglect the implementation
of EP legislation.
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